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B6-0148/2005 }  
B6-0152/2005 }  
B6-0153/2005 }  
B6-0174/2005 }  
B6-0182/2005 }  
B6-0185/2005 } RC1

## JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

pursuant to Rule 103(4) of the Rules of Procedure, by

- Bogdan Adam Klich, Elmar Brok, Karl von Wogau and Armin Laschet, on behalf of the PPE-DE Group
- Jan Marinus Wiersma, Glyn Ford and Ana Maria Gomes, on behalf of the PSE Group
- Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, István Szent-Iványi and Alexander Lambsdorff, on behalf of the ALDE Group
- Jean Lambert and Angelika Beer, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
- André Brie and Tobias Pflüger, on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group
- Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, on behalf of the UEN Group

replacing the motions by the following groups:

- PSE (B6-0148/2005)
- ALDE (B6-0152/2005)
- PPE-DE (B6-0153/2005)
- UEN (B6-0174/2005)
- GUE/NGL (B6-0182/2005)
- Verts/ALE (B6-0185/2005)

on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference – Nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran

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**European Parliament resolution on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference  
– Nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to Rule 103(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. taking into account and reiterating its previous resolutions on nuclear disarmament, and in particular its resolution of 26 February 2004 on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in May 2004,
- B. underlining that the European Security Strategy concept and the EU's Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction, as adopted by the enlarged EU, emphasises the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
- C. recognising that all the EU Member States are States Parties to the NPT and that two EU Member States are nuclear weapon states as defined in the NPT,
- D. recalling the statement by the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on UN reform that 'we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation',
- 1. Reaffirms its position that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of vital importance to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament;
- 2. Recalls that the EU's and the NPT's ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and expects the declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states to engage actively with this issue and to make further progress towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons;
- 3. Calls on the EU and its Member States - in a spirit of 'effective multilateralism' and solidarity and in pursuit of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - to form a common front at the NPT Review Conference in 2005 and make a positive contribution to the discussions; urges that their statements attach special importance to new initiatives on nuclear disarmament and the revitalisation of the UN Conference on Disarmament;
- 4. Calls on the Council and the Member States to add further substance to their common statement that 'the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be preserved' and – in support of the Union's Common Position on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-Proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery – to make a statement on the EU's Common Position and the EU Strategy at the Review Conference;

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5. Calls on the Council and the Member States to work towards the effective implementation of point 15.3 of the Final Declaration of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in order to achieve a treaty effectively banning the production of all weapons making use of fissile materials;
6. Calls on the EU to work with its international partners, including NATO, to develop and promote the principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction; asks the States Parties to fulfil their commitments made in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-state actors and proliferation of nuclear weapons;
7. Calls on the Council and the Commission to set up a programme aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge in the world;
8. Calls on all states, and nuclear weapon states in particular, not to provide assistance or encourage states which may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular those states which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
9. Stresses its strong belief that nuclear disarmament activity will contribute significantly to international security and strategic stability and also reduce the risk of thefts of plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium by terrorists; urges the EU to support the new international initiative on new nuclear dangers, as proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and by Mohammed El Baradei, Director of the IAEA, which points to the need to secure nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states both acknowledged and unacknowledged;
10. Urges the EU to work hard for the establishment of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, as has already been deposited at the UN and which could provide a framework of steps within a legally binding disarmament process;
11. Calls on the Luxembourg Presidency and the Council to provide further substance by outlining how they aim to achieve their common objective in the EU WMD Strategy to 'foster the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation', and specifically how the States Parties to the NPT might retain the unique verification and inspection experience of UNMOVIC, for example by means of a roster of experts;
12. Calls on the Council and the Commission to come forward with a proposal to persuade third states and the EU Member States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocols;
13. Calls on the Council and the Member States to clarify and step up their commitment to releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA;
14. Calls on the EU to propose, at the Review Conference in 2005, that the appropriate subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament be established by the UN Commission on

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Disarmament without further delay;

15. Calls on the EU to develop the necessary coordination mechanisms (the EU's WMD Monitoring Unit in liaison with the EU Situation Centre) to ensure that intelligence is used to build solidarity and confidence between the Member States on WMD policy;
16. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay, without conditions and in accordance with institutional processes, to achieve the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; calls on the Council and the Commission to insist on this in the dialogue with those partner states which have not yet ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT;
17. Reiterates its call on the USA to stop the development of new generations of battlefield nuclear weapons (bunkerbusters) and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; calls also on the USA to clarify the situation of the quantity and strategic objectives of its tactical nuclear arsenals stationed on European bases;
18. Welcomes the appeal, signed by 25 Nobel Prize Winners, calling on the governments of the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, to support and implement steps to lower the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe; supports the proposal made by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the establishment of a 'nuclear-free zone' in the Middle East, and calls for an effort to be made to this end;
19. Renews its support for the international mayors' campaign - initiated by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - on nuclear disarmament, and recommends that the international community carefully consider the campaign's 'Project Vision 2020', urging a scheduled programme of elimination of all nuclear weapons;
20. Welcomes the inclusion of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction clauses in the latest EU agreements with third countries and actions plans; points out that such measures must be implemented by all the EU partner countries without exception ;
21. Stresses that the prevention of any threat to the security of any country requires a commitment by the international community; emphasises the need for stronger regional and multilateral security structures in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and North-East Asia in order to reduce the pressure towards nuclear proliferation and to achieve the abandonment of nuclear programmes;
22. Calls for all political and diplomatic avenues to be explored in order to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflicts linked to nuclear proliferation;

**on Iran**

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23. Notes with concern that Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, reiterated on 27 February 2005 that Tehran would not give up its 'right under the NPT to enrich uranium', and calls on the Iranian authorities to stop making confusing and contradictory statements;
24. Takes note that, on 27 February 2005, Russia and Iran signed a nuclear fuel supply agreement paving the way for Iran to start up its first atomic reactor in Bushehr next year and obliging Tehran to repatriate all spent nuclear fuel to Russia;
25. Calls on the Council to take an initiative with the Government of the Russian Federation to obtain guarantees that its recent agreement with Iran on the delivery of nuclear material is solely intended for civilian use and to ensure support for the EU diplomatic efforts; counts on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor closely the fuel transfers between Russia and Iran;
26. Welcomes IAEA Director Mohammed El Baradei's declaration at the end of January 2005 about the progress being made by the agency's nuclear safeguard inspectors over the last 15 months in understanding the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme;
27. Reaffirms its full support for the Paris agreement of 15 November, in which Iran made the commitment to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, and to the EU 3 approach of dialogue with the Iranian authorities in order to ensure a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the nuclear issues concerning this country, and calls for objective guarantees from the Iranian Government as to the non-military nature of its nuclear programme;
28. Calls on Iran to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and to make permanent its decision to suspend uranium enrichment, thus providing lasting confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's intentions and paving the way for a cooperative partnership between the EU and Iran; insists that the negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement should be seen in parallel with a satisfactory conclusion of the nuclear issue and the establishment of reassuring verification measures;
29. Calls on the Council and the Commission to enter into negotiations with the Iranian authorities on the transfer of technology and know-how, as well as financial support for renewable energy;
30. Calls on the Iranian parliament to conclude the parliamentary ratification of the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
31. Calls on the US Government to fully support the EU diplomatic approach to resolving this problem, considers this question as essential for a renewed transatlantic agenda and welcomes the recent US statement on this matter, as well as earlier assertions that it would not engage in preventive military action against Iran;

#### **On North Korea**

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32. Is deeply concerned at the fact that North Korea declared on 10 February 2005 that it possesses nuclear weapons and suspended its participation in the six-party-talks on its nuclear programme for an indefinite period of time;
33. Notes North Korea's statement that its 'end objective is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' and urges it to abide by its obligations under the NPT, and its government and other parties involved to take concrete steps in negotiations and adopt a constructive approach;
34. Urges North Korea to rejoin the NPT, to revoke its decision to withdraw from the six-party-talks and to allow the resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean peninsula;
35. Urges both North Korea and the US to enable a speedy resolution of the current crisis, initially by offering to recommence the supply of Heavy Fuel Oil in exchange for a verified freezing of the Yongbyon plant, to avoid further deterioration of the current situation;
36. Urges the Council to consider again paying EUR 4 million of suspension costs for KEDO to South Korea, taking into account the fact that this initiative played a significant role in the recent past, and recognises that it could well serve to supply conventional energy in the future;
37. Believes that the EU should support renewed efforts to enable the DPRK to renounce the further use of nuclear energy in exchange for guaranteed energy supplies;
38. Calls on the Council and the Commission to offer financial support for heavy fuel oil supplies to remedy North Korea's primary energy needs, and asks the Commission and the Council to make the necessary approaches regarding EU participation in future 'six-party talks' and at the same time to make it clear that 'No Say, No Pay' is a principle which the EU will follow regarding the Korean Peninsula;
39. Is aware that central to the ongoing crisis are the claims that North Korea has firstly a full fledged Highly Enriched Uranium Programme and has supplied Uranium to Libya; considering, however, that neither of these claims has been substantiated, asks for a public hearing in the European Parliament to evaluate the claims;

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40. Calls on both the Council and the Commission to present a progress report to Parliament on the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in due time after the end of the Conference;
41. Decides to establish an official delegation to attend the NPT Review conference;
42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Luxembourg Presidency, the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN

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Secretary-General, the governments and parliaments of Iran and North Korea, all States  
Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA

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